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What's on Your Mind?
Imputing Motive ina
Title VII Case
by BarbaraJ. Fick
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 391-396. © 2007 American Bar Association.

employer will be held liable. In other circumstances the supervisor is
required to report personnel problems to a manager who possesses
the authority to discipline and discharge. The supervisor plays a role
in the process but does not have
final authority to make the decision.
If the supervisor acts with discriminatory animus, can the employer be
held liable for an unlawful employment practice if the manager who
made the final decision did not act
with an unlawful motive? That is
the question presented to the Court
in this case.

Barbara J. Fick is an associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School, in Notre Dame, Ind.
She can be reached at
fick.l@nd.edu or (574) 631-5864.

Editor'sNote: This case, originally
scheduled for oral argument on
April 19, was dismissed on April 12
and will not be argued.

ISSUE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII) prohibits employers
from discriminating against any
individual because of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex
when making employment decisions, such as hiring or firing. Title
VII defines employers as including
any agent of the employer. Thus, in
order for an employer to be held
liable for a violation of Title VII, it
must be proven than an agent of the
employer, acting with a discriminatory motive, caused an individual to
be subjected to an adverse employment decision.

FACTS
Stephen Peters worked as a merchandiser for BCI Coca-Cola
Bottling Company (BCI) for six
years in the Albuquerque, New
Mexico, facility. Merchandisers
deliver Coke products to retail outlets and place the product in display
areas. Merchandisers work five-day
weeks, with two days off. Since
retail accounts need to be serviced
(Continued on Page 392)

BCI COCA-CoLA BOTTLING Co.

In some instances the employer
gives a supervisor the authority to
discipline and discharge the
employees whom that individual
supervises. The supervisor, based on
his own observations and evaluations of the employees, makes decisions with regard to discipline and
discharge. If these decisions are
based on discriminatory animus, the
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determine whose motive
is at issue. The Court

seven days per week, some merchandisers are scheduled to work
on week-ends. Peters, as the most
senior merchandiser, had Saturday
and Sunday as his regularly scheduled days off.
Peters's immediate supervisor was
Jeff Katt, who is white. Peters and
Katt both reported directly to the
district sales manager Cesar Grado,
who is Hispanic. Grado was responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and
scheduling employees, but did not
have the authority to discipline or
discharge employees. Any issues
regarding employee discipline were
referred by Grado to the senior
human resource administrator at
the Albuquerque facility, Sherry
Pedersen, who had the authority to
make all disciplinary decisions
except termination. All termination
decisions required approval by
Pedersen's supervisor, Pat Edgar,
who worked in BCI's Phoenix office.
On Friday, September 28, 2001,
Grado learned he was short-handed
for Sunday and asked Katt to tell
Peters to work that day. After speaking with Peters, Katt told Grado that
Peters had plans and could not work
that day. According to Grado, Katt
also said that Peters might call in
sick; Katt, however, denied making
that statement. Grado then contacted Edgar (Pederson being out of the
office) and asked if he could require
Peters to work on his scheduled day
off; Grado also mentioned that
Peters had indicated he would call
in sick if required to work. Edgar
stated that Grado could require
Peters to work and that it was
against company policy to call in
sick two days in advance. Edgar said
that unless Peters had a compelling
reason for not working on Sunday,
Grado should give Peters a direct
order to report to work and warn
him that failure to comply would be
insubordination that could lead to
termination.

Grado then told Peters he had to
work on Sunday. Peters said he had
plans, and moreover that he had
been feeling ill all week. Grado told
Peters he was directing him to come
to work, and if he did not, it could
result in his termination for insubordination. Peters ended the conversation by telling Grado "[D]o what
[you] got to do and I'll do what I got
to do." Grado reported his conversation with Peters to Edgar. Edgar
determined that Peters's conduct
was insubordination meriting termination, but since it was late in the
day on Friday did not make a final
decision at that time.
That Saturday, Peters went to the
doctor's office, where he was diagnosed with a sinus infection and
told not to work until Monday..
Peters telephoned Katt and
informed him of his illness and that
the doctor told him not to work on
Sunday. Katt excused Peters from
working and paged Grado to let him
know; Grado, however, never
answered his page. Peters did not
work on Sunday.
On Monday, Edgar, Pederson, and
Grado spoke by telephone on several occasions concerning Peters's
conduct. Grado confirmed that
Peters had not shown up for work
on Sunday. Edgar had Pederson pull
Peters's personnel file, wherein
there was a report that Peters had
previously received a two-day suspension for insubordination involving a different supervisor. Edgar
decided to terminate Peters for
insubordination. Neither Pederson
nor Edgar had ever met Peters, and
neither knew he was black at the
time the decision was made to terminate him.
Peters filed a charge with the EEOC
alleging that his termination was the
result of racial discrimination.
During its investigation of Peters's
charge, the EEOC received evidence
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from a number of BCI employees,
including Katt, that Grado treated
black employees worse than
employees of other races, including
using racial epithets and more
closely scrutinizing the work of
black employees. In particular,
there was evidence that Grado did
not report nonblack employees for
discipline in circumstances similar
to Peters's case.
The EEOC filed suit in federal district court for the district of New
Mexico alleging that BCI discharged
Peters because of his race. The
EEOC contended that Grado's
racially biased report to Edgar
caused Edgar to terminate Peters.
BCI filed a motion for summary
judgment contending that Peters
was fired for insubordination and
that the EEOC failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a material
issue of fact that BCI's explanation
was pretext for discrimination.
The district court granted BCI's
motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the lawsuit. Although the
court found that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether
Grado had acted with discriminatory
animus, it held that this fact was
irrelevant to resolving the case at
hand. It was undisputed that Edgar
honestly believed that Peters was
guilty of insubordination and that
she was unaware of Peters's race at
the time she decided to fire him.
Moreover, Grado made no recommendation to Edgar concerning how
to handle the matter and thus did
not influence Edgar's decision.
Finally, Edgar consulted with
Pederson and received independent
information concerning Peters's
employment history from his personnel file. Since Edgar did not rely
on any recommendation from Grado
and conducted an independent
investigation, she did not act as a
"cat's paw" for Grado's alleged prejudice. Her decision could not be said
to be a pretext for discrimination.
Issue No. 7 Volume 34

The EEOC appealed the district
court's grant of summary judgment
to the federal court of appeals.
EEOC v. BCI Coca-ColaBottling
Company of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d
476 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth
Circuit reversed. It held that since
Title VII imposes liability on an
employer for its own acts and those
of its agents, common-law principles
of agency must be applied to determine when an employer is liable for
the bias of subordinate officials.
Under agency principles, an employer is liable for the acts of its employees if the employee "was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship."
Thus, if a biased subordinate uses
the authority given to him by the
employer, for example, the authority
to report disciplinary infractions to
cause an employee's termination,
the employer may be liable for the
subordinate's discriminatory animus.
If, however, the employer conducts
an independent investigation and
does not rely exclusively on the
biased subordinate's report, it will
break the causation link between
the subordinate's bias and the subsequent employment action-the final
decision cannot be said to be
"because of' the subordinate's bias.
The court concluded that "subordinate bias claims simply recognize
that many companies separate the
decision-making function from the
investigation and reporting functions, and that racial bias can taint
any of these functions."
Applying this standard to the facts,
the Tenth Circuit held that Edgar
relied exclusively on Grado's
account of the telephone conversation with Peters and did not conduct an independent inquiry into
the incident. Thus, Grado's report
caused Peters's termination. Since
the EEOC introduced sufficient evidence to raise a disputed issue of
material fact as to Grado's racial

bias, a jury could conclude that
Grado's report was tainted by bias
and therefore that the claimed reason for firing Peters, based entirely
on Grado's report, was a pretext for
discrimination. As there were genuine issues of material fact as to
Grado's bias, summary judgment
was inappropriate.

discipline or terminate employees.
Edgar was the actual decision maker, not Grado. Neither is there any
evidence to suggest that Grado
influenced Edgar's decision in any
way. He was not asked to express
an opinion concerning how to handle Peters's case, nor did he make
a recommendation.

BCI filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted, on the question of when an
employer can be held liable for a
subordinate official's bias when the
subordinate is not the actual decision maker. BCI Coca-ColaBottling
Company of Los Angeles v. EEOC,
127 S.Ct. 852 (2007).

According to BCI, the only other
avenue for employer liability for
nondecision-makers' bias under
agency law is when a person is
harmed by the employee and the
employer is "negligent in selecting,
supervising or otherwise controlling
the agent." In determining liability
based on negligence, the issue is
whether the employer knew or
should have known the subordinate
was biased and that the bias caused
an adverse employment action. An
employer who has an effective grievance mechanism for weeding out
workplace discrimination is not acting negligently in controlling its
agents. Requiring a showing of negligence in order to impose liability is
consistent with the underlying purpose of Title VII.

CASE ANALYSIS
Both parties agree that traditional
principles of agency law govern the
extent to which an employer can be
held liable for the discriminatory
animus of its subordinates. They
disagree, however, on the interpretation of those principles and how
they apply to nondecision-making
subordinates.
BCI notes that under agency law
employers are liable for acts committed by employees while acting
within the scope of their employment. Therefore, an employer is
liable if an employee, who has been
given the authority to effectuate a
tangible employment action, such as
hiring or firing, makes a decision
with discriminatory animus. Neither
can employers evade liability if the
employee given the authority to
make that decision cedes that
authority to a subordinate by relying on the recommendation of the
subordinate. In that case the subordinate is, in effect, the actual decision maker and the employer is
rightly held responsible for the subordinate's discriminatory animus.
In this case it is undisputed that
Grado had no authority to impose

BCI asserts that the congressional
intent in passing Title VII was to
encourage employers to create policies to detect and eliminate discrimination in advance, rather than to
encourage employees to file lawsuits
after the fact. A negligence standard
requires employees who believe
they are the victims of discrimination in the workplace to notify the
employer of the problem. There is
no evidence that any employee,
including Peters, ever complained to
BCI about Grado's alleged racial
bias. BCI argues that because it had
no knowledge of subordinate bias, it
was not negligent in supervising its
agents and therefore is not liable for
its subordinate's alleged bias.
BCI contends that the Tenth Circuit
imposed liability based on a provi(Continuedon Page 394)
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sion in the treatise Restatement
(Second) of Agency that holds an
employer liable for the actions of a
servant when the servant is "aided
in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."
BCI asserts that the court misinterpreted this theory of agency. The
"aided in" theory of liability is limited to situations involving misrepresentation or deceit by the servant
such that the plaintiff is misled into
believing that the agent is acting
within the scope of his or her apparent authority. BCI argues that this
theory has been so widely misinterpreted by the courts that the
Restatement (Third) of Agency has
abandoned it as expanding employer liability beyond well-established
boundaries.
Finally, BCI argues that the Tenth
Circuit's standard requiring employers to independently investigate
reports of employee misconduct in
order to insulate themselves from
the possible biased motives of subordinates places an undue burden on
employers. In effect employers would
have to investigate the motivation
behind the report as well as investigate the facts of the report itself.
Such investigations would have to be
undertaken anytime a report could
trigger an adverse employment
action, a result that would overburden human resource personnel and
cause a backlog in resolving employee personnel problems.
The EEOC contends that applying
the agency principle that employers
are liable for acts committed by
employees while acting within the
scope of their employment supports
a finding that BCI is liable for the
discriminatory animus of Grado.
When an employer delegates
authority to a supervisor to assign
work, monitor employee performance, and report employee misconduct, a supervisor exercising
that authority is acting within the

scope of his employment. If the
supervisor allows discriminatory
animus to influence the exercise of
that authority and thus causes a
tangible employment action, the
employer is liable.
In the present case, Grado was delegated the authority by BCI to assign
work, to monitor and evaluate
employees, to gather facts, and to
report on instances of employee
misconduct to the human resources
department. The actions that Grado
took in connection with Peters's termination were all within the scope
of that delegated authority: he
assigned Peters to work on Sunday;
he reported Peters for indicating
that he would refuse to work; he
allegedly mischaracterized the facts
relating to the content of his conversations with Peters; and he failed
to timely report to Edgar that Peters
had been excused from working by
Katt. As found by the district court,
there was sufficient evidence presented to raise a triable issue of fact
as to whether Grado acted with
racially discriminatory animus in
performing these delegated duties.
Finally, in order to establish
employer liability, it must be proven
that the subordinate's conduct
caused a tangible employment
action. In order to prove causation,
it must be shown that the subordinate's conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about the harm. This
requires a showing that "but for"
the subordinate's conduct, the termination would not have happened
and the subordinate's conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the termination. Thus, even when the subordinate acts with a discriminatory
motive in exercising his or her delegated authority, the employer may
not be liable if it can break the
causal link between the supervisor's
action and the tangible employment
action. One way to break the link is
if the employer conducts an inde-
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pendent investigation upon which to
base its decision, in which case the
supervisor's misconduct would no
longer be regarded as a "substantial
factor" in causing the termination.
This standard does not impose an
obligation on an employer to conduct an investigation; but if an
employer chooses to do so it may
break the causal link and thus abrogate employer liability for the subordinate's discriminatory conduct.
In the present case, the EEOC reasons, there is sufficient evidence to
permit a fact finder to find that
Grado's conduct was a substantial
factor in Peters's termination. If
Grado had not reported Peters to
Edgar, Peters would not have been
terminated. The content of Grado's
report caused Edgar to decide to
terminate Peters. Grado's failure to
timely alert Edgar to the fact that
Peters had been given an excuse by
Katt for not working on Sunday
caused Edgar not to change her
decision. Edgar's investigation consisted solely of looking at Peters's
personnel file, which contained no
information on the incident in question: Peters's so-called refusal to
work on Sunday. Edgar continued to
rely entirely on Grado for information concerning that incident; thus
the investigation did not break the
causal link between Grado's conduct
and Peters's termination.
Contrary to BCI's contention, the
EEOC asserts that employer liability
based on the agency principle of
"aided by the agency relation" is a
viable theory and has been adopted
by the Supreme Court in its decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragherv.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998). The Court held that an
employer can be liable for a supervisor's conduct when the supervisor is
aided in accomplishing a tort by the
existence of the agency relationship.

Issue No. 7 Volume 34

The supervisor is aided by the
agency relation in accomplishing a
tort when he takes a tangible
employment action, i.e., when he or
she is the actual decision maker.
The Court also held that the "aided
in" theory applies when a supervisor, acting with discriminatory
intent, uses his delegated authority
in a manner that results in a tangible employment action.
Imposing liability on employers for
a subordinate's misuse of delegated
authority causing a tangible employment action furthers the objectives
of Title VII. Vicarious liability creates an incentive for employers to
prevent their agents from causing
harm, thus achieving Title VII's goal
of encouraging employers to detect
and eliminate discrimination in the
workplace. The rule also ensures
that victims of unlawful discrimination are compensated and that the
cost of compensation falls on the
employer rather than on the innocent victim.
The EEOC argues that BCI's attempt
to limit liability to "actual" decision
makers conflicts with the express
language of Title VII. The statute
applies to "any agent" of the
employer, and is not limited to actual decision makers. Moreover, the
"actual" decision-maker standard is
contrary to the generally accepted
agency principle that employers are
liable for the acts of all employees
who act within the scope of employment, whether or not they are actual decision makers.
Finally, the EEOC notes that BCI's
argument that employers are liable
for the acts of nondecision makers
only if they are negligent is based on
an incorrect reading of Ellerth. The
Supreme Court noted in Ellerth that
negligence was a minimum standard
for employer liability, and a showing
of negligence was not required when
a plaintiff can meet the more strin-

gent standard of liability under the
scope of employment test.
SIGNIFICANCE
While this particular case is based
on Title VII, the other major federal
anti-discrimination statutes-the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act-also impose liability on employers and their agents.
Thus, the decision in this case will
also affect employer liability under
those laws. Moreover, many state
anti-discrimination laws mimic the
language of Title VII, and state
courts often refer to decisions under
Title VII when interpreting their
own statutes; thus, this decision
could impact the imposition of
employer liability under some state
laws as well.
Employer advocates have voiced
concern that if the Supreme Court
accepts the EEOC's broad imposition of employer liability for the acts
of subordinates, employers would
feel required to examine the motives
of every informant of employee misconduct in order to insulate themselves from liability. This would
undermine efforts to root out workplace problems including, for example, sex harassment, and would
impede employer ability to resolve
such problems. Moreover, imposing
liability for discriminatory actions of
nondecision-making subordinates
would eliminate any incentive a
plaintiff would have for reporting
alleged discrimination to the
employer, thus defeating one of the
purposes of Title VII: to prevent and
eliminate workplace discrimination.
There is also concern from employer advocates that adopting an investigation requirement in order to
break the causal link for a subordinate's discriminatory animus would
hamstring human resources professionals in performing their functions. Workplace misconduct

assumes many forms, and sometimes the facts are so apparent that
no independent investigation is necessary. For example, assume a
supervisor forwards lab results to
the decision maker indicating that
an employee has tested positive for
drug use. If the supervisor decided
to forward the report because of the
employee's race and the report
caused the termination, the employer would be held liable unless the
decision maker engaged in an independent investigation of the drug
use. Conducting such an independent investigation is not only
unnecessary but a waste of corporate resources.
From the employee's perspective,
however, limiting employer liability
for tangible employment actions to
only the actual decision maker's
animus would allow workplace bias
to operate unchecked. A biased lowlevel supervisor with no disciplinary
authority can still cause employee
discipline, including discharge, by
selectively reporting or even fabricating information about workers.
As the Tenth Circuit noted in its
decision, "many companies separate
the decision-making function from
the investigation and reporting functions, and ... [discriminatory] bias
can taint any of those functions." A
result that encourages employers to
verify information and review recommendations can only have a salutary effect on the workplace.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
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For Petitioner BCI Coca-Cola
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Food Marketing Institute (Robert
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American Association of Justice
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